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THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION: RECONCILING TEACHER 
TENURE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF PUBLIC 
EDUCATION 
Michael J. DeJianne* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that the 
administration and implementation of the public school system is the most 
important function of state and local governments.1  Specifically, the 
Court’s unanimous ruling in Brown v. Board of Education emphasized 
education’s significance to a child’s potential success in life and the 
survival of any democratic society.2  The decision famously held, “[s]uch 
an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right 
which must be made available to all on equal terms.”3  These words, 
though written by Chief Justice Earl Warren more than six decades ago, 
still hold true and reflect this country’s enormous investment of time, 
money, and effort into creating an education system with the goal of giving 
every child the tools necessary to succeed in life and ultimately foster our 
democracy. 
Though its importance is rarely called into question, the level of 
constitutional protection offered to education has resulted in controversial 
judicial rulings.4  Some state courts elevate the right to education to a 
fundamental interest,5 while the United States Supreme Court6 and other 
state courts have declined to do so.7  Because those states and the federal 
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 1  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).  
 2  Id. 
 3  Id. (emphasis added). 
 4  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (holding 
that education is not a fundamental right while emphasizing its high importance to society). 
 5  Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971) (holding that education is a 
fundamental right). 
 6  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 59. 
 7  Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 2865 (N.J. 1973) (holding that education is not a 
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government offer a lower level of equal protection analysis to education, 
statutes that allegedly detract from education’s quality must only be 
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.8  These decisions 
helped shape this country’s state and national education policy and, some 
argue, contributed to a deteriorating experience in the American 
classroom.9 
Some of the most controversial legislation surrounding education 
policy is teacher tenure statutes.  Tenure is an employment protection 
awarded to teachers,10 the qualifications of which vary by state.  Though 
the right to tenure does not technically create absolute immunity from 
dismissal, tenure reform advocates argue that some state statutes protect 
ineffective teachers from termination and thereby directly harm the quality 
of education.11  Overturning these statutes has proven to be difficult, 
especially when state supreme courts offer education the lowest level of 
equal protection analysis.12 
In August of 2014, a California district court held that certain state 
teacher tenure statutes violate the California Constitution.13  In Vergara v. 
State of California, Judge Rolf Treu held that the challenged teacher tenure 
statutes detracted from the quality of California’s education and enjoined 
their enforcement.14  Because California considers education a fundamental 
right, state courts must apply the highest level of equal protection 
analysis.15  Plaintiffs in New York subsequently challenged state teacher 
tenure statutes in a similar fashion.16  With the upcoming appeal of the 
Vergara decision and a trial scheduled in 2015 for Davids v. New York,17 it 
is important to analyze whether teacher tenure statutes detract from the 
quality of education and therefore violate a state’s constitution. 
This Comment aims to answer these questions, examine the plaintiffs’ 
 
fundamental right). 
 8  See, e.g., id at 496–99. 
 9  See Areto A. Imoukhuede, The Fifth Freedom: The Constitutional Duty to Provide 
Public Education, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 45, 49 (2011).  
 10  See Arnold Shep Cohen, Striking a Balance Between Teachers’ Employment Rights 
and Professional Responsibilities, N.J. LAW., July 1993, at 43 (outlining various state laws 
regulating teacher tenure, including probationary periods and teacher effectiveness).  
 11  See Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban 
Students from Teachers’ Unions, 63 ALA. L. REV. 177, 195 (2011).  
 12  See generally, infra Parts II & III. 
 13  Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014). 
 14  Id. at *5–7.  
 15  Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971).  
 16  See Javier C. Hernandez, New York Educators Fight Back on Attacks to Tenure, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/nyregion/new-york-
educators-fight-back-on-attacks-to-tenure-.html. 
 17  Davids v. New York, No. 101105/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 24, 2014). 
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arguments in Vergara and Davids, and evaluate the effectiveness of New 
Jersey’s recent teacher tenure reform.  Parts II and III of this Comment 
outline federal and state equal protection analysis and the level of 
protection education receives from the Supreme Court and the state courts 
in New Jersey, New York, and California.  Part IV examines the current 
landscape of teacher tenure in these states and explains Judge Treu’s 
analysis in the Vergara decision.  Part V then applies the plaintiffs’ 
arguments in Vergara and Davids to California and New York’s equal 
protection clauses.  Ultimately, this Comment advocates for courts to 
accept the plaintiffs’ arguments, recognize the states’ teacher tenure 
statutes as void, and direct the California and New York legislatures to 
adopt an approach similar to New Jersey’s recent reform.  Part VI 
concludes. 
II. HOW IS EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYZED? 
A.  Federal Equal Protection Analysis 
Before evaluating the constitutional validity of current teacher tenure 
statutes as they relate to the right to public education, it is necessary to 
examine courts’ equal protection clause analyses.  The Supreme Court has 
traditionally utilized a three-tiered test when legislation is challenged under 
the United States Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause (“the Equal 
Protection Clause”).18  First, laws that affect fundamental rights or classify 
individuals based on race and national origin are subject to the highest level 
of scrutiny.19  Legislation that falls under this category must serve a 
compelling interest, and the government action must be narrowly tailored 
to allow the violation of equal protection.20  Second, laws that classify 
individuals based on gender are traditionally analyzed under intermediate 
scrutiny.21  This analysis requires the law to be substantially related to an 
important government interest.22  Finally, at a minimum, any statutory 
classification must be rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.23  All laws, whether passed by Congress or state legislatures, must 
meet this constitutional floor.24  Any law that fails to meet this “rational 
basis” standard violates the Equal Protection Clause25 and will be void. 
 
 18  See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).  
 19  See id. (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 672 (1966)). 
 20  Id. 
 21  See id. (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976)).  
 22  Id. 
 23  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973). 
 24  Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959). 
 25  See id. 
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B.  New Jersey’s Equal Protection Analysis 
Though the Supreme Court’s equal protection analysis is highly 
influential, each state utilizes a unique approach to its respective state 
constitution’s equal protection clause.  The New Jersey Constitution’s 
Liberty Clause (“the Liberty Clause”) reads, “[a]ll persons are by nature 
free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, 
among which are those enjoying and defending life and liberty, of 
acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and 
obtaining safety and happiness.”26  While the Liberty Clause does not 
explicitly mention equal protection, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
read it to grant equal protection under the law.27 
When a statute is challenged under the Liberty Clause, the court 
departs from the three-tiered federal analysis and opts for a balancing test 
that weighs the right violated against the need for the alleged inequality.28  
In Greenberg v. Kimmelman, the New Jersey Supreme Court outlined this 
fluid balancing test where state courts must consider “[t]he nature of the 
affected right, the extent to which the governmental restriction intrudes 
upon it, and the public need for the restriction.”29  According to the court, 
this analysis uses an approach implicit in the federal test.30  Justice Pollock 
explained, “in [federal] equal protection analysis, the nature of the right is 
the crucial consideration in characterizing a right as ‘fundamental,’ the 
initial step in determining whether the governmental regulation will receive 
‘strict scrutiny’ or a more relaxed standard of judicial review.”31  While the 
New Jersey Supreme Court’s test is less mechanical than the federal test, it 
still aims to define the importance of the right and analyze the level of 
protection that right receives from the Liberty Clause.  This guarantees 
protection against unequal treatment of people who should be treated alike, 
such as all students in the classroom.32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 26  N.J. CONST. art. I, § 1.   
 27  See Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196, 211 (N.J. 2006).   
 28  See Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294, 302 (N.J. 1985). 
 29  Id.   
 30  See id. 
 31  Id.  
 32  Id. 
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C.  California’s Equal Protection Analysis 
Much like New Jersey, California applies a different equal protection 
analysis than its federal counterpart.  California’s equal protection clause is 
in-depth and reads more like a statute than a constitutional provision.33  
Like the Equal Protection Clause, however, California’s equal protection 
clause still ensures that “[a] person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law or denied equal protection of the 
laws.”34  At its core, this article promises that persons who are similarly 
situated are treated equally under the law.35 
The California Supreme Court has held that the state’s equal 
protection clause possesses validity independent from the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.36  When legislative action 
classifies individuals and is challenged as violating the state’s constitution, 
California courts use a two-tiered standard of review.37  The California 
Court of Appeals explained in Molar v. Gates that strict scrutiny analysis is 
required for the violation of fundamental interests or suspect 
classifications.38  The state must show that the violation of the right or the 
creation of such classification is necessary to accomplish a compelling 
interest.39  California does not recognize a distinction between 
classifications of race or gender.40  Instead, the state analyzes these 
classifications under the same level of scrutiny.41  All other legislation must 
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose, meeting the 
constitutional floor that the Supreme Court requires.42 
 
 
 
 33  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.  In 1979, the California Legislature amended this 
provision to specifically outline how instruments of the state must enforce equal protection.  
This clearly departs from New Jersey, New York, and the United States Constitution’s 
respective equal protection amendments, as it is much more in depth. 
 34  See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).  
 35  In re Evans, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 314, 319 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).   
 36  See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d. 592, 598 (Cal. 
1979). 
 37  See Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
 38  Id. at 247. 
 39  Id. 
 40  See, e.g., Sail’er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d. 529, 540–41 (Cal. 1974) (holding that a 
California statute prohibiting women from obtaining bartender licenses compels the 
application of strict scrutiny analysis and ultimately violates the equal protection clause of 
the California Constitution).   
 41  Id. 
 42  Molar, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 247.   
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D.  New York’s Equal Protection Analysis 
New York’s Constitution extends equal protection of state laws to all 
persons and prohibits the violation of an individual’s civil rights.43  When 
statutes are challenged under this constitutional provision, the New York 
Court of Appeals opts to use an analysis that closely resembles the 
Supreme Court’s three-tiered test.44  First, strict scrutiny is appropriate in 
New York for an alleged discrimination based on suspect classification or 
violation of a fundamental interest.45  Second, in Alevy v. Downstate 
Medical Center, the New York Court of Appeals explained intermediate 
scrutiny, or the “sliding scale” test.46  The court first must ask if the alleged 
discrimination satisfies a substantial state interest and furthers a legitimate 
government purpose.47  If the discrimination or violation of rights serves a 
substantial state interest and furthers a governmental purpose, then the 
court must answer if the objectives could be achieved by less offensive 
means.48  Third, similar to the federal analysis, all classifications must be at 
least rationally related to a legitimate government interest.49 
III.  IS THERE A RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION? 
A.  The Guarantee of an Equal Education 
The administration of public schools largely falls on state and 
municipal governments.50  While some argue that the United States 
Department of Education has taken strides towards creating a national 
education policy,51 state constitutions, particularly those of New Jersey, 
California, and New York, require that their respective legislatures provide 
free schooling to all children.52  The practical effect of this constitutional 
obligation has led to legislatures passing numerous statutes that regulate 
nearly every aspect of operating a statewide education system.53  These 
include mechanisms for funding each school district, education standards 
 
 43  N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
 44  See Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
 45  Id. at 635.   
 46  See Alevy v. Downstate Med. Ctr., 348 N.E.2d 537, 545–46 (N.Y. 1976).   
 47  Id. at 545. 
 48  Id. at 546. 
 49  Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 638.   
 50  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7 (1973).  
 51  See Sarah G. Boyce, The Obsolescence of San Antonio v. Rodriguez in the Wake of 
the Federal Government’s Quest to Leave No Child Behind, 61 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1027 
(2012).  
 52  CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
 53  See, e.g., School Funding Reform Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-44 (West 2008) 
(outlining the structure and calculations used to fund New Jersey’s public school system for 
all children between the ages of five and eighteen).  
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for student advancement, and evaluation criteria for teacher and 
administrative job performance.54  These statutes show that education 
policy is, very much so, both a state and local concern.  When individuals 
believe that this legislation detracts from the state’s educational experience, 
the laws are challenged as violating the state’s guarantee of an education.55 
Legal precedent in this area evaluates whether government benefits or 
programs are elevated to fundamental rights.  States provide many services 
that its citizens need, some of which are mandated by their state 
constitutions.56  For example, the New York Constitution requires the state 
legislature to maintain a public welfare system in support of the needy.57  
While this is certainly an important role for the government, the New York 
Court of Appeals has held that public welfare is not a fundamental right.58  
Likewise, education is not elevated to a fundamental right in many states, 
and therefore receives a lower level of protection under a state’s equal 
protection clause.59  But, as the Supreme Court explained, state laws that 
violate equal protection must always bear at least some rational relationship 
to a legitimate government interest.60  Therefore, in states where education 
is not a fundamental right, laws cannot go below this constitutional floor 
and detract from a basic level of education. 
Many landmark judicial decisions regarding the administration of 
education have focused on state funding mechanisms.61  In New Jersey, 
California, and New York, the public school system is primarily funded by 
general revenue raised through property and income taxes.62  Those 
opposed to the funding scheme have argued that poorer school districts do 
not have access to adequate tax revenue, resulting in an inferior educational 
experience that violates the state’s constitutional obligation and equal 
 
 54  See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44830 (West 2009) (outlining the employment qualifications 
for public school teachers); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F-44; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3220 
(McKinney 2008) (requiring all students to participate in physical fitness exams during the 
academic year). 
 55  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 1 (challenging the constitutionality of the education 
funding system in Texas). 
 56  See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (requiring the state legislature to provide public 
support to the needy). 
 57  Id. 
 58  Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.S.2d 359, 365 (N.Y. 1982).  
 59  See, e.g., id. (holding that education is not a fundamental right in New York). 
 60  Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).   
 61  See, e.g., Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (challenging the 
constitutionality of the education funding system used in New Jersey). 
 62  CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 8 (requiring that state revenue be set aside for public school 
funding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7F (West 2008); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3602 (McKinney 
2014) (requiring that public money be made available to each school district from state and 
local revenue). 
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protection.63  Key cases from New Jersey, California, and New York are 
helpful to summarize for purposes of this Comment.  Each decision 
discussed below outlines the obligation to provide an education and 
analyzes whether the respective constitutional provisions recognize a 
fundamental right.  This will ultimately provide a framework to discuss 
whether the challenged teacher tenure statutes violate the state constitution. 
B.  The Supreme Court’s View 
There is neither an explicit nor an implicit guarantee to education 
under the United States Constitution.64  The U.S. Supreme Court was 
confronted with this question in San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez.65  At trial, plaintiffs argued that the Texas public education 
financing system, through the Texas Minimum Foundation School Program 
(“Program”), violated the Equal Protection Clause.66  The Program was 
designed in response to the development of industrial cities and population 
shifts, which resulted in many rural Texas communities lacking sufficient 
public school funding.67  The legislature understood that disparities in 
expenditures harmed the quality of education in rural districts and passed 
legislation designed to increase funding.68  The Program supplied funds to 
school districts from general state revenue, which financed each district 
with roughly eighty percent of the annual school budget.69  The remaining 
funds came directly from the district’s budget by way of local property 
taxes, calculated as a percentage of residential and commercial property 
value.70  The goal of the Program was twofold: (1) place the heaviest 
burden on school districts most capable of paying and (2) ensure that every 
school district contributes to the education of its children without 
completely exhausting local resources.71 
The plaintiffs came from Edgewood, the least affluent district in the 
San Antonio area.72  Because of low property values and limited municipal 
resources, the district could only contribute $26 to the education of each 
student for the 1967–1968 academic year.73  With the contribution from the 
Texas state revenue, total expenditures per student for the academic year 
 
 63  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1973).   
 64  Id. at 35.  
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. at 9–10. 
 67  Id.  
 68  Id. at 9–11.   
 69  See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 9.   
 70  Id. at 9–10.   
 71  Id. at 10.   
 72  Id. at 11.  
 73  Id. at 12.   
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were $248.74  At trial, plaintiffs introduced the 1967–1968 expenditures of 
Alamo Heights, the most affluent district in the San Antonio area.75  
Because of greater property values and state contribution, Alamo Heights 
supplied $594 per pupil.76  The federal district court concluded that the 
Program failed strict scrutiny analysis under the Equal Protection Clause on 
the basis that an individual’s wealth is a suspect classification, and 
education is a fundamental right.77 
The Supreme Court overturned the district court on two separate 
grounds.78  Writing for the majority, Justice Powell explained that the 
plaintiffs failed to offer evidence that the financing system discriminated 
against a definable group of impoverished people and led to a total lack of 
education.79  It was unclear to the majority if the Program discriminated 
against all poor people, all people with lower property values, or the ten 
percent of Texas school districts surveyed for purposes of trial.80  The 
Court therefore concluded that the financing system did not disadvantage a 
suspect class.81 
The majority then held that education is not a fundamental right that 
requires a higher level of scrutiny.82  Justice Powell explained that 
education is vital in a free society, both to individual citizens and the 
country as a whole.83  The importance of a state function, however, does 
“not determine whether [that function] must be regarded as fundamental for 
purposes of examination under the Equal Protection Clause.”84  
Fundamental rights are provided to individuals through a guarantee in the 
Constitution, while economic and social rights call for a lower level of 
scrutiny under equal protection analysis.85  Because it is not explicitly nor 
implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution, the Court concluded that 
education is not a fundamental right.86 
 
 
 
 74  Id.   
 75  See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 12–13.  
 76  Id. at 13.   
 77  Id. at 16.  
 78  Id. at 18.  
 79  Id. at 23–25. 
 80  Id. at 26–27. 
 81  See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.   
 82  Id. at 30. 
 83  Id.  
 84  Id.   
 85  See id. at 34–35.  
 86  Id.  
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C.  New Jersey’s View 
The New Jersey Supreme Court confronted a similar public school 
funding issue in the same year as the Rodriguez decision.87  In Robinson v. 
Cahill, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of New Jersey’s public 
school financing plan.88  Much like Texas’ Program, New Jersey’s public 
schools received funding from general state revenue and local property 
taxes.89  This resulted in a disparity of dollars spent per pupil, particularly 
in areas with low property values.90  The plaintiffs argued that this 
inequality violated a student’s fundamental right to an education, asking the 
court to declare the funding scheme as void on the basis of the Liberty 
Clause.91 
In addition to the guarantee of equal protection through the Liberty 
Clause, the New Jersey Constitution requires the legislature to supply a 
“thorough and efficient” public school system to all children.92  Plaintiffs 
urged the court to invoke the highest level of scrutiny when evaluating the 
funding scheme’s violation of this constitutional provision.93  The plaintiffs 
specifically pointed to the Supreme Court’s holding in Rodriguez, which 
elevated explicit constitutional guarantees to the level of fundamental 
rights.94  The plaintiffs argued that the holding in Rodriguez only bolstered 
Chief Justice Warren’s unanimous decision in Brown, where the Court held 
that “[s]uch an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is 
a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.”95 
The New Jersey Supreme Court used the Rodriguez decision to guide 
its analysis and found that the funding disparities neither violated a 
fundamental right nor invoked the highest level of scrutiny under the 
Liberty Clause.96  Chief Justice Weintraub explained that the guarantee of 
an efficient education does not mandate a uniform expenditure plan.97  The 
constitutional guarantee implicitly involves municipal participation, which 
undoubtedly leads to varying budgets and expenditures.98  While 
involvement at the state level is constitutionally mandated, the funding 
disparities that result from the statutory scheme are not “irrational” and do 
 
 87  See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973). 
 88  Id. at 276.   
 89  Id.  
 90  Id. at 276–77.   
 91  See id. at 277.   
 92  N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 4. 
 93  Robinson, 303 A.2d at 28384. 
 94  Id. at 282.   
 95  Id. at 284 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).   
 96  See id. at 282. 
 97  Id. at 286.  
 98  Id. at 286–87.   
DEJIANNE (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2015  2:45 PM 
2015] COMMENT  343 
not invoke a higher level of scrutiny.99  Therefore, the requirement to 
furnish a service does not automatically elevate the state’s obligation to a 
fundamental right.100 
D.  New York’s View 
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, New York’s public school 
funding scheme faced numerous challenges in the Board of Education v. 
Nyquist line of cases.101  Like New Jersey and Texas, New York’s funding 
scheme resulted in disparities where property values were low.102  In the 
case’s final disposition, the New York Court of Appeals looked to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Rodriguez and ultimately held that education 
is not a fundamental right.103  Justice Jones explained that public education 
is one of the most important services that the state performs, a notion 
expressly manifested in the New York State Constitution.104  As mentioned 
supra, however, dedication to a government program does not 
automatically elevate the level of scrutiny to that of a fundamental right.105  
Other constitutionally mandated programs, such as public assistance to the 
needy, are also very important but do not call for a higher level of 
scrutiny.106  Strict or intermediate scrutiny is appropriate only when the 
state action groups persons together by reason of personal characteristics, 
such as race or gender.107  For these reasons, the court held that the proper 
standard of review for purported violations of the right to education in New 
York is rational basis.108 
E.  California’s View 
California’s view of public education departs from the holdings in 
Rodriguez, Robinson, and Nyquist.109  In Serrano v. Priest, California’s 
public school funding statutes encountered a challenge for violating 
California’s equal protection clause.110  Similar to challenges in New York 
 
 99  Robinson, 303 A.2d at 286.  
 100  Id.  
 101  Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978), modified by 
Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981), modified by Bd. of Educ. 
v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359 (N.Y. 1982). 
 102  See Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 361.   
 103  Id. at 367. 
 104  N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
 105  Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
 106  N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
 107  Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
 108  Id.  
 109  See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). 
 110  Id. at 1244.  
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and New Jersey, plaintiffs attacked the statutes for creating funding 
disparities that resulted in substandard educational opportunities for 
students living in school districts with lower property values.111  The 
plaintiffs argued that this violated a fundamental right.112 
The California Supreme Court believed that the plaintiffs’ claims had 
legal merit and remanded the proceedings for trial.113  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Sullivan noted that the right to public education in 
California is a fundamental interest,114 requiring a higher level of scrutiny 
for an alleged violation.  In support of this conclusion, the court pointed to 
Chief Justice Warren’s decision in Brown.115  Justice Sullivan explained 
that the majority in Brown espoused two themes when speaking about the 
importance of education: (1) the importance to individuals and (2) the 
importance to society.116  Both of these themes directly impact the success 
of America’s democracy, and are both supported by the language in 
California’s Constitution: “A general diffusion of knowledge and 
intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties of 
the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the 
promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural 
improvement.”117  Because of the “distinctive and priceless” role that 
education serves in society, the majority held that the right to education is a 
fundamental interest that requires the highest level of scrutiny and 
protection.118 
F.  What Really Affects a Student’s Education? 
The plaintiffs in the preceding cases attacked plans funding education 
in Texas, New Jersey, California, and New York.119  With the exception of 
California, the courts largely rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that education 
 
 111  Id.   
 112  See id. at 1255 (noting “[p]laintiffs’ contentionthat education is a fundamental 
interest”). 
 113  Id. at 1265.   
 114  See id. at 1255–56 (“The fundamental importance of education has been recognized 
in other contexts by the United States Supreme Court and by this court.  These 
decisionswhile not legally controlling on the exact issue before usare persuasive in 
their accurate factual description of the significance of learning.”). 
 115  Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1256 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).  
 116  Id. at 1257. 
 117  CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 1; Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 
1). 
 118  Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1258. 
 119  San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Serrano, 487 P.2d at 
1241; Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 
359 (N.Y. 1982). 
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deserves heightened constitutional protection.120  The courts held that 
disparities in funding do not violate a fundamental right, while recognizing 
education’s significance to society.121  As mentioned supra, the importance 
of education is exemplified by this country’s commitment of time, money, 
and effort into educating every child.  Even though not every state 
recognizes education as a fundamental right, this commitment compels 
legislatures to ensure that laws governing educational policy meet the 
required level of equal protection, even if that level is the “constitutional 
floor.”122  Laws that fail to meet the standard and detract from a student’s 
education should, therefore, be declared void.123 
Though funding is an important aspect of operating state public school 
systems, it is not the primary influence on education’s quality.124  For 
example, some statistics show that Newark, New Jersey spends about 
$22,000 per pupil, while only 22% of students graduate from high 
school.125  In comparison, Chatham, New Jersey spends about $12,000 per 
pupil and has a high school graduation rate of virtually 100%.126  Some 
may argue that comparing New Jersey’s largest city to a small suburb 
creates an inaccurate portrayal of Newark’s school system.  But the facts 
cannot be ignored: Newark, and many cities like it, spends huge sums of 
money on its public school system with extremely disappointing results.  
Therefore, other factors have as much, if not more, influence on a child’s 
education. 
The Supreme Court has recognized some of these other factors that 
affect public education’s quality.127  In Brown, the Court famously struck 
down the segregation of children in public schools based on race.128  Even 
if facilities were “tangibly” equal, the psychological effect of separating 
students based on physical characteristics negatively impacts students’ 
education.129  The Court, therefore, recognized that environmental factors 
 
 120  See supra note 119. 
 121  Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30; Robinson, 303 A.2d at 283–84; Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 
366. 
 122  See Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959).   
 123  See id. 
 124  See Dagostino supra note 11, at 180. 
 125  Id. 
 126  STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NJ School Performance Report 7 (2014), 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/pr/2013/27/270785010.pdf; SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE 
CHATHAMS, Budget Newsletter 2 (Apr. 2014), http://www.chatham-
nj.org/cms/lib/NJ01000518/Centricity/Domain/992/Budget%20Newsletter%202014-
2015.pdf.   
 127  See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 128  Id. at 495.   
 129  Id. at 494. 
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have an impact on education’s quality.130 
The Supreme Court also held that facilities and materials play an 
important role in education’s quality.131  In Sweatt v. Painter, the plaintiff 
was denied admission to the University of Texas Law School based on his 
race.132  Texas operated a law school solely for African Americans, 
something that the Texas Court of Civil Appeals found as an appropriate 
remedy for the plaintiff.133  The Supreme Court disagreed and ordered the 
University of Texas to admit the plaintiff to its law school.134  In its 
analysis, the Court compared the schools’ facilities.135  The University of 
Texas had access to scholarship funds, moot court facilities, and 65,000 
volumes in its library.136  The African American law school had no faculty, 
almost no volumes in its library, and lacked accreditation.137  The Court 
held that the insufficient facilities detracted from the plaintiff’s legal 
education and, therefore, violated his constitutional rights.138  Implicit in its 
decision, Painter recognized that facilities and academic materials have an 
effect on one’s education.139 
While funding, environmental factors, facilities, and materials all play 
a vital role in the quality of a public school, effective teachers play the most 
vital role.140  A teacher has the most lasting impact on a student’s 
education, with some studies showing that students with effective teachers 
earn more money, are less likely to have children in their teens, and are 
more likely to attend college.141  According to the same study, an 
ineffective teacher could lead to almost $2.5 million of lost lifetime 
earnings per classroom.142  Providing the best teachers for students only 
seems logical with these results; however, some argue that teacher tenure 
statutes directly detract from this goal by protecting ineffective teachers’ 
positions.143  If teachers detract from the classroom experience and are 
 
 130  See id. 
 131  See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 132  Id. at 631.  
 133  Id. at 632. 
 134  Id. at 636. 
 135  Id. at 632–33.  
 136  Id.  
 137  Painter, 339 U.S. at 633.   
 138  Id. at 636. 
 139  See id. 
 140  See, e.g., Annie Lowrey, Big Study Links Good Teachers to Lasting Gain, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/06/education/big-study-links-good-
teachers-to-lasting-gain.html?pagewanted=all. 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. (“Replacing a poor teacher with an average one would raise a single classroom’s 
lifetime earnings by about $266,000 . . . . Multiply that by a career’s worth of classrooms.”). 
 143  Dagostino, supra note 11, at 195. 
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protected from termination, this practice may have constitutional 
implications even at the lowest equal protection analysis.  This leads us to 
an important discussion about teacher tenure and its effect on the classroom 
experience. 
IV.  THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF TEACHER TENURE 
A.  What is Tenure? 
Tenure was initially established to provide protection from random 
termination and create a degree of permanency and expertise within the 
teaching profession.144  Tenure guarantees that an employee can only be 
dismissed for cause after a hearing is held and a decision is rendered by the 
state’s education agency.145  Contrary to popular belief, tenure for public 
school teachers does not provide absolute immunity from termination.146  
As explained in Donahoo v. Board of Education, the goal of tenure is to 
ensure that the best teachers continue service and are protected from 
termination based on arbitrary or capricious reasons.147  Proponents of 
tenure argue that this protection adds value to the classroom experience, 
while opponents believe it restricts the ability of administrators to 
effectively shape state education policies and standards.148  Laws regulating 
the hearing process vary by state; however, the charges that an individual 
teacher may face for termination are less varied.149  Therefore, it is possible 
to terminate a tenured teacher’s position.150 
B.  Efforts at Tenure Reform: The TEACHNJ Act 
The recent economic downturn, shrinking state budgets, and 
underperforming schools brought teacher tenure to the forefront of the 
education reform debate.151  Many states passed legislation modifying 
teacher evaluations, extending the probationary period before teachers 
become tenure-eligible, and eliminating the highly controversial “last-in, 
 
 144  See Laura McNeal, Total Recall: The Rise and Fall of Teacher Tenure, 30 HOFSTRA 
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 489, 491 (2013).   
 145  See id. at 492.   
 146  Cohen, supra note 10, at 43. 
 147  Id. (citing Donahoo v. Bd. of Educ., 109 N.E.2d 787, 789 (Ill. 1952)). 
 148  Compare McNeal, supra note 144, at 490 (explaining that recent attempts to 
eliminate tenure have been viewed by many teachers as an attack on the profession), with 
Dagostino, supra note 11, at 195 (arguing that tenure keeps ineffective teachers in the 
classroom).   
 149 Cohen, supra note 10, at 43 (noting that a teacher may be disciplined for inefficiency, 
incapacity, unbecoming conduct, or other just cause). 
 150  Id. 
 151  See McNeal, supra note 144, at 489. 
DEJIANNE (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2015  2:45 PM 
348 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:333 
first-out” seniority system utilized for school layoffs.152  New Jersey was 
not immune to the budgetary and education issues faced by other states, 
and Republican Governor Chris Christie felt that tenure reform would help 
improve some of the state’s ailing school districts.153  After a highly 
publicized fight between Governor Christie, the Democratic controlled 
legislature, and the New Jersey Education Association, all three eventually 
worked together to create the first comprehensive tenure reform in New 
Jersey since 1909.154 
In 2012, New Jersey passed the Teacher Effectiveness and 
Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act (the “TEACHNJ Act”) 
for the 2013–2014 academic year.155  The TEACHNJ Act addresses the 
probationary period and evaluation process for public school teachers in 
New Jersey.156  As mandated by the law, teachers become eligible for 
tenure after one year of mentorship with an experienced teacher followed 
by two positive evaluations over the following three years.157  The new 
evaluation system rates teachers as “ineffective,” “partially effective,” 
“effective,” or “highly effective.”158  A panel of experienced teachers and 
administrators completes the evaluations, balancing both subjective and 
objective factors.159  Once tenure is earned, two consecutive years of an 
“ineffective” rating result in a loss of tenure.160  The teacher then must have 
two consecutive years of “effective” or “highly effective” ratings in order 
to avoid dismissal.161  Further, the costs of a dismissal hearing are capped 
at $7500.162  According to supporters of the TEACHNJ Act, this allows 
administrators and state regulators to proceed against an ineffective teacher 
without being discouraged by expensive and ongoing litigation, a problem 
that existed before the TEACHNJ Act’s passage.163 
 
 152  See id. at 498–99 (detailing Michigan’s new law that created a five-year probationary 
period, Indiana’s new law that created four categories for teacher evaluations, and Nevada’s 
new law that eliminated automatic seniority protection during school layoffs).   
 153  See Dagostino, supra note 11, at 180 (explaining that only twenty-two percent of 
students in Newark, New Jersey graduate from high school); McNeal, supra note 144, at 
501–02. 
 154  McNeal, supra note 144, at 501.  
 155  See Teacher Effectiveness and Accountability for the Children of New Jersey Act, 
N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-117 (West 2012). 
 156  N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-118(b). 
 157  Id.  
 158  McNeal, supra note 144, at 502.   
 159  Id. 
 160  Id. 
 161  Id. at 502–03. 
 162  Id. at 503. 
 163  Id.; Dagostino, supra note 11, at 194 (explaining that in some states, a legal battle for 
teacher dismissal costs an average of $500,000).  
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C.  Legal Challenges Brought Against Teacher Tenure 
1. Vergara v. California 
In the same year that New Jersey passed the TEACHNJ Act, tenure 
reformers in California mounted a legal battle in Vergara v. California.164  
The plaintiffs challenged five statutes from the California Education Code 
that allegedly violated the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution.165  The statutes included California Education Code: (1) 
Section 44929.21(b) (the “Permanent Employment Statute”); (2) Section 
44934 and Sections 44938(b)(1)–(2) (“Dismissal Statutes”); and (3) 
Section 44955 (“Last-In-First-Out Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).166  The 
plaintiffs argued that each statute protected ineffective teachers from 
dismissal, which contributed to a failing education system within their 
respective school districts.167  Because education is considered a 
fundamental right in California, the plaintiffs believed that the statutes 
failed under strict scrutiny analysis and violated the guarantee of equal 
protection under the California Constitution.168 
Arguing before Judge Treu, the plaintiffs presented evidence that the 
Permanent Employment Statute disadvantaged both students and competent 
teachers.169  As mandated by the statute, teachers are informed of their 
tenure status at the end of a two-year probationary period.170  In practice, 
the decision must be communicated by March 15th of the second year, 
approximately three months before the end of the academic term.171  This 
requires administrators to make the actual decision well before the March 
15th deadline.172  The teacher simultaneously undergoes a credentialing 
process during the first two years of employment; however, that decision 
cannot be made until the actual expiration of the second academic term.173  
This inconsistency can result in a district having a tenured teacher without 
state credentials.174  Plaintiffs also presented evidence that if any doubt 
arose as to a teacher’s ability, time constraints forced administrators to 
make a tenure decision without adequate opportunity for the teacher to 
 
 164  See Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014). 
 165  Id.; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 166  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *2.  
 167  Id. 
 168  Id.  
 169  Id. at *4. 
 170  Id. 
 171  Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21 (West 2014). 
 172  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. 
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prove competency.175 
Judge Treu held that this statute unfairly affected both students and 
teachers.176  Because education is considered a fundamental right in 
California, the state must offer a compelling reason for students to be 
deprived of potentially competent teachers and for teachers to not have 
enough time to prove their abilities within the classroom.177  Judge Treu 
found that the state failed its burden and held that the Permanent 
Employment Statute violated the equal protection clause of the California 
Constitution.178 
Judge Treu also found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the equal 
protection clause of the California Constitution.179  Plaintiffs presented 
evidence that a California dismissal hearing may take up to ten years and 
would cost a school district between $50,000 and $450,000.180  During 
trial, defense witnesses admitted that it was nearly “impossible” to 
terminate a tenured teacher’s position under the current statutory scheme.181  
The state argued that a teacher, or any public employee, is entitled to due 
process during a dismissal hearing, making the Dismissal Statutes 
necessary.182 
Judge Treu agreed that due process is a right, but explained that other 
certified school employees must only be made aware of their dismissal 
charges and be given the right to respond at a hearing.183  Judge Treu found 
no compelling reason to give teachers extra due process protections 
afforded by the challenged statutes, particularly when the result would keep 
ineffective teachers employed.184  While teachers, and other public 
employees, have a right to due process, this right cannot detract from the 
fundamental right afforded to California’s students.185  For these reasons, 
the court found that the Dismissal Statutes violated the plaintiffs’ 
fundamental right to an education and the state’s equal protection clause.186 
Lastly, Judge Treu found that the LIFO Statutes resulted in 
“classroom disruption” and agreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
 
 175  Id at *5. 
 176  Id. 
 177  Id. 
 178  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.   
 179  Id. at *6. 
 180  Id. at *5. 
 181  Id. 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. at *6. 
 184  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6. 
 185  Id. 
 186  Id. 
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provision violated a student’s constitutional rights.187  When school layoffs 
are necessary, the LIFO Statutes regulate teacher dismissals;188 the last-
hired teacher is the first dismissed, without consideration of the teacher’s 
quality or effectiveness.189  Judge Treu explained that the defendants would 
need to present a compelling reason for the “de facto retention of 
incompetent [teachers]” in order to defend the LIFO Statutes’ existence.190  
Judge Treu found the logic of the defendant’s position to be 
“unfathomable.”191  California recognizes education as a fundamental right 
that requires the highest level of equal protection analysis.192  
Automatically keeping ineffective teachers in the classroom directly 
impacts education’s quality, violating students’ constitutional rights.193  For 
these reasons, Judge Treu held that the LIFO Statutes failed strict scrutiny 
analysis.194 
2. Davids v. New York 
Shortly after Judge Treu decided Vergara, two separate lawsuits were 
filed in New York challenging the state’s teacher tenure statutes.195  In 
Wright v. New York and Davids v. New York, plaintiffs submitted 
complaints arguing that certain New York Education Law statutes keep 
ineffective teachers in the classroom and infringe upon a student’s 
fundamental right to a sound and basic education.196  Similar to the tenure 
provisions in Vergara, the plaintiffs in Wright and Davids challenged New 
York Education Laws: (1) Section 2509, Section 2573, and Section 3012 
(“Permanent Employment Statutes”); (2) Section 3020 (“Dismissal 
Statutes”); and (3) Section 2585 and Section 3013 (“Last-In-First-Out 
Statutes” or “LIFO Statutes”).197  Because the two lawsuits have similar 
arguments against the same statutes, Judge Phillip Minardo granted the 
New York Attorney General’s motion to consolidate the cases.198  Going 
 
 187  Id. at *6.   
 188  CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955 (West 2014). 
 189  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955. 
 190  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6. 
 191  Id.   
 192  Id. at *1. 
 193  Id. at *7. 
 194  Id. 
 195  See Hernandez, supra note 16. 
 196  Complaint at 3, Wright v. New York, No. 1500641/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 
28, 2014) (“This suit challenges the constitutionality, in whole or in part, of Education Laws 
§§ 2509, 2510, 2573, 2585, 2588, 2590, 3012, 3012-c, 3020, and 3020(a) (the ‘Challenged 
Statutes’).”) [hereinafter Wright Compl.]; Complaint at 3, Davids v. New York, No. 
101105/2014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed July 24, 2014) [hereinafter Davids Compl.].  
 197  Wright Compl. at 3; Davids Compl. at 3.  
 198  Beth Fertig, Judge Approves Merger of Teacher Tenure Lawsuits in New York, 
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forward, plaintiffs will now argue solely under Davids v. New York.199 
V.  DO THE CHALLENGED TENURE STATUTES VIOLATE A RIGHT TO 
EDUCATION? 
The Vergara plaintiffs will have their arguments tested in an 
upcoming appeal, while the plaintiffs in Davids must argue in a state that 
provides the lowest level of equal protection analysis to education.200  Both 
New York and California have recognized the importance of education and 
the integral role that teachers play in a child’s academic development.201  
The courts, therefore, must determine if the challenged teacher tenure 
statutes detract from a student’s education and survive the state’s equal 
protection analysis. 
A.  The California Appellate Court Should Uphold Vergara 
Tenure reform advocates viewed the Vergara decision as a victory, 
while teacher unions across the nation accused Judge Treu of blaming 
teachers for failing educational institutions.202  In response to the court’s 
opinion, California Governor Jerry Brown appealed the decision, 
explaining that “[c]hanges of this magnitude, as a matter of law and policy, 
require appellate review.”203  As explained supra, the California Supreme 
Court has held that education is a fundamental right.204  This affords 
students the highest level of scrutiny under equal protection analysis, 
requiring that a violation of that right be necessary and narrowly tailored to 
accomplish a compelling interest.205  Further, teachers are the most 
important aspect of a student’s education.206  An effective teacher leads to 
the heightened possibility of personal and professional success.207  While 
teacher tenure is certainly good public policy in order to ensure some level 
of employment protection and expertise in the profession, there is no 
compelling reason for that protection to infringe upon a fundamental right, 
 
WNYC.ORG (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.wnyc.org/story/teacher_tenure_lawsuits_ 
proceed_to_court/.   
 199  Id.  
 200  Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982); Adam Nagourney, 
California Governor Appeals Court Ruling Overturning Protections for Teachers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/us/california-governor-fights-
decision-on-teacher-tenure.html?_r=0. 
 201  Serrano v. Priest, 467 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971); see Vergara v. California, 2014 
WL 6478415, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
 202  Nagourney, supra note 200. 
 203  Id.   
 204  See Serrano, 467 P.2d at 1255. 
 205  Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). 
 206  See Lowrey, supra note 140. 
 207  Id. 
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particularly when the effects on a student are potentially disastrous.  For 
this reason, the appellate division of the superior court should uphold the 
decision in Vergara and force the California legislature to reform state 
tenure statutes. 
California’s Permanent Employment Statute, Dismissal Statutes, and 
LIFO Statute violate the California Constitution and conflict with tenure’s 
goal of providing a level of expertise within the profession.208  The 
plaintiffs’ evidence shows that a teacher: (1) is granted tenure after an 
inadequate amount of time, (2) is afforded due process protection that 
makes it nearly impossible to be dismissed, and (3) is automatically 
protected during school layoffs regardless of the teacher’s quality or 
effectiveness.209  This system provides tenure and termination protection to 
ineffective teachers. 
The Permanent Employment Statute forces administrators to evaluate 
a teacher’s effectiveness in an inadequate time period.210  In practice, the 
statute uses one full academic year as the primary criteria for granting 
tenure.211  Dr. John Deasy, Superintendent of the Los Angeles School 
District, testified that the mandated time period is insufficient to determine 
tenure eligibility.212  Both the plaintiffs and defendants offered evidence 
that a three- to five-year probationary period would be better suited to 
evaluate a teacher’s abilities.213  As previously mentioned, administrators 
use only one full year of evaluations to determine a teacher’s eligibility for 
tenure.214  Because of the short timeframe, the Permanent Employment 
Statute creates a possibility that ineffective teachers are granted tenure.  
The results ultimately detract from California’s education, harm students, 
and violate the state’s equal protection clause. 
The Dismissal Statutes discourage administrators from pursuing the 
termination of an ineffective teacher due to the unnecessarily heightened 
due process procedures.215  The plaintiffs submitted evidence that a 
dismissal proceeding can cost upwards of $450,000, and defense witnesses 
 
 208  See McNeal, supra note 144, at 491. 
 209  See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b) (West 2014); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44934; CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 44938(b)(1)(2); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955; Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 
6478415 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014). 
 210  See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44929.21(b); Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *4. 
 211  See supra note 210. 
 212  Motoko Rich, Deasy Resigns as Los Angeles Schools Chief After Mounting 
Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/us/lausd-john-
deasy-resigns-superintendent-los-angeles.html.  
 213  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5.   
 214  Id. 
 215  See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 44934, 44938(b)(1)–(2); Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at 
*5. 
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testified that the termination of a tenured teacher is “extremely rare.”216  
The high cost of litigation caused by the mandated process discourages 
administrators from pursuing a dismissal.217  This only protects ineffective 
teachers and detracts from education in California. 
California also protects ineffective teachers through its LIFO Statutes.  
When layoffs occur, no weight is given to a teacher’s effectiveness or 
abilities; rather, seniority is the sole criterion used for dismissals.218  This 
could conceivably lead to a situation where a highly effective teacher with 
ten years of experience is dismissed instead of an ineffective teacher with 
eleven years of experience.  The Vergara defendants could not offer a 
logical reason why such a system should exist.219  As explained by Judge 
Treu, the defendants’ position requires them to argue that a competent 
teacher’s position should be terminated over an ineffective teacher’s 
position simply because of his or her hire date.220  As with the Permanent 
Employment Statute and Dismissal Statutes, the LIFO Statute detracts from 
the quality of education and violates California’s equal protection clause. 
Under California’s strict scrutiny analysis, the defendants fail to show 
that the challenged statutes are necessary for a compelling state interest.221  
The legislature’s goal to protect teacher employment cannot trump the 
constitutional obligation to provide all students with an education, 
particularly when the quality of education is negatively impacted.  Granting 
tenure to ineffective teachers, and preventing their subsequent dismissal, 
violates a fundamental right and detracts from expertise within the 
profession.  The challenged statutes, therefore, violate the equal protection 
clause of the California Constitution and directly undermine tenure’s goals.  
For these reasons, the appellate court should uphold Judge Treu’s decision 
and declare the statutes as void. 
B.  The Current New York Statutes Should Be Declared Void 
As mentioned supra, the Court of Appeals of New York held in 
Nyquist that education is not a fundamental right.222  Therefore, an alleged 
violation under the state’s equal protection clause need only be rationally 
related to an important government interest to be constitutional.223  In 
 
 216  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *5. 
 217  Id. 
 218  See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44955; Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6. 
 219  Vergara, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6. 
 220  See id. 
 221  Molar v. Gates, 159 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (requiring a compelling 
need to violate a fundamental right).  
 222  Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982).   
 223  Id. 
DEJIANNE (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2015  2:45 PM 
2015] COMMENT  355 
Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, the court established the 
constitutional floor to be met in order for the legislature to meet its 
obligation to provide an education.224  Judge Pigott explained that schools 
must teach “the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to 
enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants 
capable of voting and serving on a jury.”225  In order for the plaintiffs in 
Davids to succeed, they must demonstrate a causal connection between the 
challenged statutes and a failure to provide students with a sound and basic 
education.226  If the court finds that the statutes serve a legitimate 
government interest, the plaintiffs will ultimately fail.227 
The plaintiffs in Davids outline tenure’s effect on education in New 
York and argue that the state’s Permanent Employment Statutes, Dismissal 
Statutes, and LIFO Statutes violate a student’s right to a sound 
education.228  Much like California’s challenged statutes, the plaintiffs 
offered evidence that the evaluation process for granting tenure is 
inadequate, that high litigation costs discourage administrators from 
dismissing ineffective teachers, and that seniority is the only factor 
considered during school layoffs.229  Plaintiffs argue that effective teachers 
are the primary “input” of a sound education, explaining that “students 
taught by effective teachers are more likely to attend college, . . . earn 
higher salaries, reside in higher quality neighborhoods, and save for 
retirement.”230  Because the challenged statutes keep ineffective teachers in 
the classroom, they directly contribute to the legislature’s failure to provide 
a basic education.231  Therefore, the plaintiffs’ rights under the New York 
Constitution are violated.232 
Plaintiffs argue that New York’s Permanent Employment Statutes 
ensure that ineffective teachers are almost guaranteed tenure.233  A teacher 
receives tenure after two annual performance evaluations within a three-
year probationary period.234  Administrators use the Annual Professional 
 
 224  N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50 
(N.Y. 2006). 
 225  Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 52 (quoting Campaign for Fiscal Equity 
v. New York, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 2003)).  
 226  Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 861 N.E.2d at 52.  
 227  Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
 228  Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 3. 
 229  Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 7, 14; Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 8–15. 
 230  Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 8.  
 231  Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 3. 
 232  Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 22. 
 233  Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 10 (explaining that in 2007, ninety-seven percent 
of eligible teachers received tenure). 
 234  N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2509, 2573, 3012 (McKinney 2014); Wright Compl., supra note 
196, at 9. 
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Performance Review (“APPR”) to evaluate performance.235  Teachers are 
rated as “Highly Effective,” “Effective,” “Developing,” or “Ineffective.”236  
Student academic growth accounts for twenty percent of a teacher’s rating, 
while in-class observation and local achievement metrics account for the 
remaining eighty percent.237  Plaintiffs argue that the inadequate 
probationary period and the APPR’s focus on subjective factors result in 
ineffective teachers earning tenure.238  An administrator cannot reasonably 
determine the long-term effectiveness of a teacher within three years, and 
the focus of teacher evaluations should not be reliant on subjective 
factors.239  In 2013, for example, 91.5% of New York teachers were rated 
as “Highly Effective” or “Effective,” while only 31% of students met 
standardized test proficiency in English and Mathematics.240  These results 
do not support the position that students are being provided a basic 
education under the standard established in Fiscal Equity.241  If the 
plaintiffs can show that the Permanent Employment Statutes inadequately 
rate teachers and directly harm education, the statute will likely fail under 
the rational basis test. 
Plaintiffs also claim that the Dismissal Statutes require a number of 
unnecessary hurdles to be cleared before a teacher’s employment is 
terminated, leaving ineffective teachers in the classroom.242  New York’s 
public employees are afforded due process rights before being dismissed.243  
An employer must provide notice and the right to respond before the 
termination is effective.244  According to the plaintiffs’ complaint, the 
Dismissal Statutes provide teachers in New York with “super due process” 
that results in years of expensive litigation.245  One study cited in the 
complaint concluded that the average dismissal costs $313,000 and can last 
two and a half years.246  This discourages administrators from even 
 
 235  Wright Compl., supra note 196, at 10. 
 236  Id. 
 237  Id. at 10–11.   
 238  Id. at 11. 
 239  Id. at 12–13. 
 240  Cathy Woodruff, Why Are Most Teachers Rated Effective When Most Students Test 
Below Standards?, N.Y. STATE SCH. BDS. ASSOC. (Dec. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nyssba.org/news/2013/12/12/on-board-online-december-16-2013/why-are-most-
teachers-rated-effective-when-most-students-test-below-standards/. 
 241  Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006). 
 242  See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3020 (McKinney 2014); Davids Compl., supra note 
196, at 11. 
 243  See Beck-Nichols v. Bianco, 987 N.E.2d 233, 242 (N.Y. 2013). 
 244  Id.  
 245  Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 11.   
 246  Id. (citing Accountability for All, N.Y. STATE SCH. BDS. ASSOC. 1 (Mar. 2007), 
http://www.nyssba.org/clientuploads/gr_3020a_reform.pdf).  
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attempting to remove a tenured teacher.247  Because this process results in 
ineffective teachers remaining in New York classrooms, the statute will 
most likely fail to meet the constitutional floor established by courts. 
Lastly, the plaintiffs argue that the LIFO Statutes protect ineffective 
teachers from facing dismissal and harm students’ right to a sound and 
basic education.248  The New York LIFO Statutes require administrators to 
exclusively consider seniority as the determinant for dismissal when school 
layoffs are necessary;249 no consideration is given to teacher quality or 
effectiveness.250  As mentioned earlier, tenure’s goal is to retain a level of 
expertise within the profession.  The LIFO Statutes do, in fact, offer 
employment protection to effective teachers who have seniority.  This 
obviously adds to the quality of education in New York.  An automatic 
protection for senior teachers, however, is not the only way to achieve this 
goal.  The defendants in Davids will need to argue that ineffective teachers 
with seniority should remain employed over more effective junior teachers 
during school layoffs.251  This position is untenable.  Because the LIFO 
Statutes keep ineffective teachers in the classroom, these statutes 
negatively affect the quality of education and ultimately violate the state 
constitution.252 
Although New York offers the right to education the lowest level of 
equal protection analysis, the court in Davids should find the Permanent 
Employment Statutes, Dismissal Statutes, and LIFO Statutes void.253  
Plaintiffs offered ample evidence to suggest that the challenged statutes fail 
to meet the constitutional floor described in Fiscal Equity.254  Because 
education is not a fundamental right, legislation affecting its quality only 
needs to serve a legitimate government interest; however it still must meet 
this constitutional floor.255  While providing job security to teachers adds to 
the expertise within the profession, the current legislation in New York is 
not the best way to meet this goal.  Keeping ineffective teachers in the 
classroom only hurts students and does not fulfill the legislature’s 
obligation to provide a sound and basic education.  For these reasons, the 
court in Davids should find the challenged statutes unconstitutional and 
 
 247  See Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 12. 
 248  Id. at 13. 
 249  N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 2585, 3013 (McKinney 2014); Davids Compl., supra note 196, 
at 13. 
 250  See supra note 249. 
 251  See Vergara v. California, 2014 WL 6478415, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 27, 2014). 
 252  Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 1415. 
 253  Bd. of Educ. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359, 366 (N.Y. 1982). 
 254  Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2006). 
 255  Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 527 (1959); Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d at 
366. 
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direct the legislature to reform state tenure laws. 
C.  Balancing Tenure and Education 
Though it has only been in effect for one full academic year, the 
TEACHNJ Act is an example of how California and New York can balance 
job protection, state equal protection requirements, and the state’s 
obligation to provide an education.256  The law ensures that earning tenure 
in New Jersey is no longer a rubberstamp process, where the only 
requirement is surviving a three-year probationary period.257  The law 
requires a more thoughtful evaluation of a teacher’s skills and training over 
four years.258  The evaluations are regulated by uniform state standards and 
are administered by various education experts and professionals.259  Once 
tenure is earned, the benefit is not conferred for life.260  Teachers who fail 
to remain effective throughout their careers may lose tenure; however, this 
does not happen immediately.261  The teacher has two years to prove his or 
her effectiveness in the classroom after tenure is lost.262  This balances the 
employment interests of teachers and allows the state to provide students 
with the best possible educators. 
New Jersey’s approach would most likely pass the constitutional 
standards of both California and New York while positively contributing to 
each state’s ailing school districts.  California and New York approach the 
constitutional obligation to education differently; however, each state’s 
high court recognizes education’s importance.263  Because teachers have 
the most influence on a student’s education, legislatures must ensure that 
the most effective teachers remain in the classroom.264  New Jersey’s tenure 
model serves both California’s high constitutional standard and New 
York’s requirement to provide a sound and basic education.265  Instituting a 
comprehensive evaluation process and protecting effective teachers only 
adds to the educational experience, protects students’ rights, and fulfills 
California’s and New York’s commitment to providing an education to 
their students. 
 
 256  N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-117 (West 2012). 
 257  N.J. STAT. § 18A:28-5; McNeal, supra note 144, at 501. 
 258  See supra note 257.  
 259  N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-112, 119. 
 260  Id.; McNeal, supra note 144, at 501. 
 261  N.J. STAT. § 18A:6-117; McNeal, supra note 144, at 501. 
 262  See supra note 261. 
 263  See Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 1255 (Cal. 1971); Bd. of Educ. v. 439 N.E.S.2d 
359, 366 (N.Y. 1982). 
 264  See Davids Compl., supra note 196, at 8. 
 265  Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1255; Campaign for Fiscal Equity v. New York, 861 N.E.2d 50, 
53 (N.Y. 2006). 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
State and federal courts have consistently recognized education’s 
importance to society.266  While each jurisdiction has differing views of the 
constitutional obligation to provide an education, New York, New Jersey, 
and California agree that a certain level of education must be available to 
all students.267  Even at the lowest level of equal protection analysis, state 
courts and legislatures are obligated to ensure that laws bear some rational 
relationship to a legitimate government interest.  When teacher tenure 
statutes interfere with the classroom experience and create disruption in a 
student’s learning environment, those laws fail both strict scrutiny and 
rational basis review, and therefore must be changed.  For these reasons, 
the challenged teacher tenure statutes in California and New York should 
be repealed and a new statutory scheme, like the TEACHNJ Act, should be 
instituted. 
 
 
 266  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973); Robinson v. 
Cahill, 303 A.2d. 273, 286 (N.J. 1973). 
 267  Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1256; Robinson, 303 A.2d. at 286; Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 
828 N.E.2d at 53. 
